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Tripartism in Comparative and Historical Perspective
Richerd Croucher and Geoffrey Wood
This article provides an overview of interpretive approaches to the historic
development of tripartism globally. Locating tripartism firmly within four broad
approaches to labour management, we seek to qualify those strands that regard the
phenomemon as lacking in current relevance. We argue that elements of post-war
compromises persist and indeed have been recently initiated even if in many societies
they exist in dilute form. Thus, the concept’s very elasticity and polyvalence ensures its
continued relevance, in turn calling for further examination of its historic evolution.
Keywords: Tripartism; comparative; transnational history
Interest in state-led co-ordination of trade unions and employers’ bodies, and notably in
social and wage pacts in Western Europe has been considerable in the Twenty-First
Century1. Simultaneously, there has been discussion of the diminished scope and intensity
of the tripartite political exchanges characteristic of corporatism in its earlier post-1945
incarnations, and questioning of the continued viability of more limited forms of
interaction even in densely-institutionalised Europe2. Outside of Europe, the evolution of
different forms of national institutional dialogue has attracted only limited interest. It is in
this context, where the nature of national institutional dialogue on employment and social
issues is still under discussion and its future is also called into question, that this special
issue presents a range of contributions on the history of tripartism that allow development
of a secular perspective on these debates. Historical concerns are frequently stimulated by
those of the present and this is especially the case in contemporary history.3 Anglo-Saxon
historians may feel that the age of tripartism is at an end, but the contributions within this
issue show that although this may accurately reflect current perceptions, tripartism
continues, albeit often in weak forms, in other national and transnational contexts; its
history therefore retains contemporary resonance.
In our present age, it is commonly assumed that the relative power of employers has
increased at the expense of government – the central co-ordinating actor in tripartism –
and organized labour. Within the firm, not only workers, but also traditional managers
have been displaced by assertive investors and allied to them, a new managerial class that
has little emotional capital sunk in the firm other than as a vehicle for shareholder value
maximization or release, and personal enrichment. From the business historian’s
viewpoint, these assumptions raise a number of issues surrounding long term trends and
diversity in the nature of the capitalist ecosystem within which tripartism is located. In this
connection, there are four alternative points of view on broad approaches to labour
management. The first, rooted in the then apparent solidity of the British postwar tripartite
settlement, was that the incorporation of labour’s institutions was structurally essential to
the state’s role in avoiding or genuinely resolving crises.4 The second sees tripartism as
very much an historical exception, representing to a large extent a product of a very
specific set of historic circumstances around the Great Depression and the post-World War
Two long boom.5 The third, a variant of the second, would see historic compromises
q 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Business History, 2015
Vol. 57, No. 3, 347–357, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2014.983479
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 07
:41
 12
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
between the state, employers and workers as a reflection of the thirty year period of
relative global prosperity and growth which had deeper historic roots stretching back at
least into the Nineteenth Century.6 The fourth highlights national diversity in global
capitalism and views the labour management options adopted according not only to
temporal trends but also to such dimensions as space, scale, and global centre-periphery
relations.7 The latter view implies that elements of post-war compromises may persist,
even if, within many of the advanced societies, they do so in dilute form.8
Tripartism as historical exception
Tripartism almost by definition requires a polity within which e´lites are prepared to
institutionalize compromise with labour. Yet a very wide and diverse body of thinking
from across the political spectrum suggests that the normal condition of society for
centuries has been characterized by labour repression, entailing the extraction by relatively
small e´lites of the bulk of any surplus generated. The great theorist of American slavery,
John Calhoun, defended it through the assertion that labour coercion was encountered in
all societies, and that modern slavery represented a relatively benign form in that it
ostensibly encompassed welfare commitments on the behalf of masters which were absent
under the impersonal relations of wage labour.9 This view, of course, challenges the
argument that labour coercion both under slavery and more widely is often irrationally
cruel since human property was often wilfully damaged by its owners.10
More generally speaking, it can be argued that e´lites are extremely reluctant to
compromise even when the alternatives are social disorder or war. Marx believed that
though repression had hitherto been universal, general emancipation was possible, and,
indeed that wage labour already represented an improvement on any previous form of
production. He was also notoriously skeptical of the possibility of meaningful reform and
class compromises. Why then, were the great compromises of the post war settlement
constructed? The weight of opinion here is that they reflected a highly specific set of
circumstances. In the Anglo-Saxon economies, labour had been hugely strengthened by
rearmament, war and an anti-fascist ideological consensus. The inter-war Great
Depression and the rise and collapse of fascism compromised the legitimacy of defenders
of untrammeled corporate power, and highlighted the exhaustion of policy alternatives
short of class compromise. A policy alternative that had been advocated by organized
labour in Germany and Britain since the late Nineteenth Century, that is the partial
integration of unions into national government decision making, was therefore adopted.11
Strong foundations had already been laid in the inter-war period and were strengthened in
wartime in Britain and the USA.12 In the Cold War era, a strong social democratic
movement was widely seen as a vital bulwark against the spread of communism.13
At a somewhat less meta-theoretical level, a range of contemporary accounts within
the political economy and employment relations literature suggests that not only has the
position of workers and their representatives been worsening for many years, and
markedly so in the period following the oil price shock of the mid-1970s, but also that such
trends are very difficult or impossible to reverse.14 In the Twenty-First Century, trade
union density in Britain is reverting to its position a century ago, arguably its secular
mean.15 This reflects the extraordinary strengthening of capital during the “third wave” of
globalization, forcing all countries onto a neo-liberal path. Even more pessimistic
variations of this point of view suggest that the ultimate outcomes may be large scale
starvation, authoritarianism and war.16
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Relative prosperity and elites
A second point of view would be that tripartite compromises reflect changes in e´lite
composition and/or strategies which, in turn, are conditioned by overall economic growth.
Elite composition approaches encompass the work of Priestland and recent work by Karel
Williams and colleagues at Manchester.17 These theories draw on a strong historical
patrimony developed by Barrington Moore Jr who famously documented the historic
linkages between governing bourgeoisies and democratic institutions in major economies,
noting the significance of the absence of both.18 Priestland assumes that e´lites tend to be
divided between merchant/capitalists, militarists and intellectuals.19 Only when the latter
are in leadership – which is only likely to occur when the former two groups have
succeeded in utterly exhausting and discrediting themselves - are class compromises
likely.
Williams and colleagues focus on the extent to which in recent years financial interests
may capture policy-making processes and are able to exert influence largely independent
of democratic constraints.20 Wood and Lane argue that during periods of economic crisis,
owners of highly fungible assets are likely to assume predominance over more patient
investors, and those with sunk capital (traditional managers and workers) within the
firm.21 The argument finds historic underpinning from the differential support that diverse
e´lite groups afforded Nazism in inter-war Germany.22 Wood and Lane reject the view that
the present age represents a return to rentier power, however, as investors with highly
fungible assets include sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), who are opening up a new type of
statism which simply bypasses corporatist arrangements. In most cases, behaviour will not
be far removed from that of traditional rentiers.23 However, some SWFs, most notably
Norway’s, pursue a social agenda that might be conducive to compromise at firm, but not
at societal level. Others encompass thinly-veiled foreign policy ambitions, which have
little to do with traditional firm practice. However, the picture is a far from uniform one as
labour stakeholders do tend to encourage dialogue or compromise with worker interests at
firm level.24
An important new book by Piketty presents a somewhat different viewpoint.25 Piketty
is, in common with theorists of near-inevitable labour coercion, somewhat skeptical as to
the possibilities of meaningful class compromises other than in very particular
circumstances. However, in his study of wealth spanning the last three centuries, he
argues that in hard economic times, societal inequality has risen as e´lites concentrate their
resources in speculative rather than productive investment. In contrast, in times of growth
such as the thirty-year post-war boom, the societal base of consumption widens, making
more productive investment attractive; this, in turn, increases workers’ bargaining power,
encouraging class compromise. As the rate of return on financial assets invariably exceeds
the rate of growth, when, as in the present, growth is low, social inequality widens.26 This
makes for further concentration of wealth and power in the hands of e´lites, reducing the
likelihood of social compromises.
Tripartism and scale
A limitation of the preceding sets of arguments is that they are, above all, temporal
theories, linking the relative power of societal groupings to long-term shifts in the nature
of capitalism in the advanced economies. A central reference point for much of the
literature on comparative capitalism has been developed and relates in particular to in
particular, coordinated markets - the Rhineland economies and Scandinavia – where
stakeholder rights are relatively strong. As firms are bound by dense or “thick” ties to a
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range of societal interests, mirrored by societal level institutions, they are founded on long-
term compromises and ongoing reconstructive deals between state, business and labour.27
These societies, in which tripartism is a more or less ‘natural’ state of affairs, remain an
analytic reference point that stands in sharp contrast to that of the Anglo-Saxon model. Yet
current theories of comparative capitalism highlight the extent to which very different
types of capitalism, with quite distinct forms of societal relations (and not simply the
Rhineland or Anglo-Saxon forms) may coexist in different national settings across the
globe.28 This would suggest that tripartite deals are possible across a much wider range of
contexts internationally than has often been assumed.
The post-2008 economic crisis reopened debate as to the relative embeddedness of
national institutions, and the degree of ‘path dependence’ to be found in different national
settings. Pessimistic accounts, such as that of Streeck, suggest that broad historical trends
towards the dissolution of non-financial ties ultimately over-ride distinct national
historical legacies, leading to the gradual unravelling of more coordinated types of
capitalism.29 In contrast, and informed by the radical economic geography literature,
‘variegated capitalism’ approaches highlight the tensions between a global capitalist
ecosystem, and nation-specific forms of institutional mediation.30 Thus, social democratic
re´gimes on the ‘global periphery’ have proven capable of building institutional
frameworks that incorporate labour via tripartite mechanisms and which have also been
associated with a degree of economic success.31 In Russia, an alternative specific form of
‘social partnership’ persists, reflected in an agreement with the International Labour
Organisation, dubbed ‘coercive corporatism’, which also embodies weak forms of
tripartism.32
In practical terms, it can further be argued that supra-national and national
institutions are at best loosely coupled. Consequently, for example, the seemingly
overwhelming power of international financial institutions varies greatly from setting to
setting; many Asian nations and Russia sought to stockpile foreign exchange reserves in
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, precisely to avoid having to accept IMF policy
prescriptions in the future. Moreover, the uneven and declining nature of US influence
has ensured that the political evangelization of neo-liberalism has been decreasingly
well-received. Finally, as Morgan notes, Multi-National Enterprises choose to invest in
countries for a range of reasons, from natural resources through market access to a desire
to benefit from particular local production regimes.33 The relative draw of these factors
(and, in particular, the relative strength of the latter) will, in turn, impact on the extent to
which firms make strategic compromises and associated adjustments in organizational
practices according to setting. All this would suggest that some national governments
have much more power - and, indeed, greater incentives - to engage in tripartite deals,
than others. In the case of Western companies purchasing goods from low-wage
countries, as we illustrate below, they have responded to concerns by ethical investors,
consumer opinion and other companies to push developing-world governments for, and
to participate in tripartite deals.
This might suggest closer examination of the historic development of types of
capitalism across the world and how it has conditioned corporatist arrangements such as
tripartism. Study of the Latin American experience suggests the importance of political
conjunctures within the state construction process which gave rise to such weak tripartite
phenomena as Peronism in Argentina; more recent conjunctures have also evoked
similarly labour-oriented state responses with complementary inputs sought from other
civil society actors.34 Recent analyses have stressed the relationship between
institutionalization and economic segmentation outside of the advanced economies.
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Although there have been numerous attempts to categorize emerging markets around
the world into distinct capitalist archetypes - for example, Hierarchical Market Economies
and Segmented Business Systems – a common strand in such categorizations is of
structural internal economic divides, and uneven institutional coverage.35 Although
democratic transitions - for example those which followed immediately on from African
independence in the 1960s or the post-Apartheid transition in South Africa - may
encourage tripartite deal making, such deals tend to be somewhat short-lived. Whilst
organized business may initially favour arrangements of this type to secure stability
through transitions, a bedding-down of the new order means that compromises are
invariably challenged at the expense of workers’ organisations. When such deals retain
their form, uneven regulation and enforcement may result in limited coverage. This does
not mean however that tripartism has entirely disappeared even in these countries, nor
does it remove it as a viable option elsewhere.
Structures are reconstituted and remoulded through actors’ strategic choices.
Although a favourable social, economic and political environment may allow more room
for novelty and creativity in such choices, even in bleak times, the possibility and type of
social compromise at least in part reflects decisions by unions and other social actors.
This does not mean that an optimal set of best practices for unions exists that is readily
transposable between contexts and periods, as has been highlighted by the very mixed
record of organizing unionism outside of California. However, political actions within
and in support of tripartite mechanisms by some trade union movements in Latin
America were pursued with success during the democratic transitions at the end of the
Twentieth Century and, as Sandbrook and colleagues demonstrate, in other settings
where popular movements have acted in concert with unions to pressure e´lites.36 Thus,
the contemporary situation at global level is one of the uneven application of weaker
forms of tripartism.
Variations in tripartism: evidence from around the world
Tripartism remains a set of arrangements that is integral to the ‘European model’ of
industrial relations.37 Three of the articles published here make significant contributions to
the transnational history of European tripartism in the comparative and supra-national
meanings of the ‘transnational’ term.38 Chris Minns and Marian Rizov operate on a broad
temporal and spatial canvas to examine tripartism’s impact on wage moderation and
dispersion since 1970.They show that, notwithstanding the importance of national
institutional effects, government involvement in wage bargaining generally led to
increased wage moderation and reduced wage dispersion across the countries they
investigated, and that this effect persisted even when the institutional basis for it was
eroded or disappeared. The return to Belle E¯poque levels of social inequality in many of
the advanced societies vests this finding with particular importance; tripartite deal-making
around wages and related conditions of work, at least in this period, represented a proven
policy mechanism for promoting greater equity – and a more sustainable basis for
consumption – without entering unchartered policy waters. Moreover, not only did these
arrangements encourage wage moderation; they also created the conditions for enhanced
productivity in manufacturing industry, a lesson that present-day Britain, with stagnant or
declining wages for the bulk of the population, and stagnating productivity rates might
heed. Centralised bargaining did not, as some industrial relations researchers have
suggested, lead to relatively large increases for union members but rather created
‘concertina’ effects. Tripartism was in this sense part of a virtuous circle in the period
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which continued to have lingering and positive consequences even well after the Golden
Age itself ended.
Thomas Prosser and Emmanuelle Perrin contribute an article on the historical
development of tripartism at the EU level which tends to confirm the strong reservations
some scholars have expressed on the effectiveness of this level of ‘social dialogue’.39
Their article examines the ‘new phase’ of the European social dialogue’s credentials as a
system of European tripartism, judging it against four essential criteria. They concur with
De Boer et al. on its broadening and de-intensification; though the ‘new phase’ of the
social dialogue has broached innovative topics, its outputs are peripheral and its
implementation patchy. Prosser and Perrin reflect on the difficulties associated with
transnational tripartism and the increasing dilution of the European social dialogue,
especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis. One especially interesting aspect of the
article is the backlight that it throws on the national history of tripartism: its marginality,
weak and piecemeal implementation has represented little impediment to tripartism’s
persistence. In other words, challenges to the social model in Europe co-exist with
remarkably persistent specific features. Again, pressures to develop pan-Eurozone
governance features may create a new political space for new forms of tripartism, even if
the prospect seems relatively remote at the time of writing.
Guglielmo Meardi, Juliusz Gardawski and Oscar Molina adopt a comparative
transnational historical approach to compare the evolution of weakly-institutionalised
forms of tripartism subsequent on transitions to democracy (soon followed by European
Union integration) in Spain and Poland, showing the referential significance of the former
case for the latter. Despite widespread criticism of tripartism’s functioning in both cases,
the authors concur with Hassel’s more measured estimation of these arrangements’
function in ‘Eastern’ Europe.40 The authors argue for Tripartism’s stabilizing and
‘foundational’ function and point out the arrangements’ longevity in both national cases.
While certain structural constraints are identified by the authorial team, the durability of
these limited forms of tripartism appear to illustrate its functionality and certainly show its
viability in rather diverse national contexts with very distinctive historical legacies.
Jimmy Donaghey and Paul Teague review the rise and fall of the Irish experiment in
social partnership. Initially, it led to a “benign” period of productivity-driven growth.
Foreign manufacturing multinationals operating in Ireland provided an engine for the
revival of manufacturing, but nonetheless did not generate pressures for better and more
supportive institutions, as they could draw on their own internal capabilities. Moreover,
they were drawn to Ireland for reasons (such as a favourable tax re´gime and market access)
that had little to do with the national production re´gime, and had few incentives to reform
or deepen the latter. Ultimately, the increased stranglehold of financial services on the
Irish economy undermined the partnership’s functionality; returns from financial
speculation eclipsed what could be accrued from deploying capital productively and the
social compromises this may have entailed. This made it easy for employers and the state
to abandon it during the 2008 economic crisis, ironically making any move to a more
balanced economy more difficult.
Two further articles published here deal with extra-European manifestations of
tripartism. Bernard Gann, David Morgan and Peter Sheldon explore the development of
Singaporean tripartism. This reflected the desire of government to bolster its social
legitimacy and foster growth whilst marginalizing political opposition; the subordination
of organized labour was achieved through inclusion. The emerging order was built on
traditional cultural values and the desire for social cohesion: the resultant system of
“enforceable benevolence” brought with it both economic and social advances, but these
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were linked with political developments that were very different from the post-war social
democracies of Europe. As is the case with corporatism, tripartism does not necessarily
rest on fully democratic institutions; rather, it can serve as a policy tool to help facilitate
social stability and hence, diminish pressures for radical political reform. Given that gross
social inequality is ultimately difficult to sustain without constant war or repression, this is
a lesson that many current Western governments might heed.
Geoffrey Wood, Gilton Klerk and Pauline Dibben contribute on Southern Africa
where Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa all experimented with tripartite initiatives
during the democratization period. Whilst in all instances this brought secure and
significant improvements in worker rights, relative enforceability reflected variations in
state capabilities and political will. Ultimately, none of the experiments brought about the
far-reaching class compromises which many believe are ultimately necessary to secure
social stability in these societies characterized by extraordinarily high levels of social
inequality. The authors ascribe this to neo-liberalism’s policy hegemony, shifting e´lite
composition (with the rise of political entrepreneurs once liberation had been secured),
dominant partyism, and the extent to which rising commodity prices have removed
urgency from the need to find economic solutions. However, mineral price volatility and
the often negative effects growth in mineral extraction has elsewhere in national
economies underscores the relevance of a type of social compromise that has been, in other
contexts, associated with superior levels of equality and productivity.
Notwithstanding these substantial contributions, and despite widespread and insistent
advocacy of ‘trans-national’ history, a particularly significant lacuna remains in the history
of tripartism: the historical role of the ILO and its interactions with other international and
national-level actors.41 The ILO’s foundation as the first tripartite international body gave
institutional embodiment to the concept at global level. Yet in common with other
international organizations the ILO itself has felt constrained by current views of labour
rights and its web of external relationships from elaborating on its own successes in the
area.42
The ILO’s activities in support of tripartism, including how they were received by and
impacted upon national collective institutions certainly require further research, which
may be co-ordinated under the umbrella of the ILO’s centenary history project.43 Until
1939, the ILO was a largely developed-world institution principally concerned with
advancing employee welfare, cautious and bounded advocacy of collective institutions
including in the colonial world and consolidating its own legitimacy.44 In the post-war
period, its internal organization and the wider context meant that it could play a significant
role in developing tripartism. It has been argued that its influence—and its emphasis on
tripartism with it–declined greatly from the early 1980s essentially because of a major
environmental shift: recession, the rise of neo-liberalism, and US global hegemony.
Structural Adjustment Programmes and the resultant expansion of informal sectors all
rendered institutional industrial relations less significant.45 Standing has argued that these
developments brought an inadequate response from the ILO, suggesting that it lost
influence in relation to the international financial bodies and essentially abandoned
tripartism in favour of the ‘Decent Work’ agenda.46
The view threatens to obscure important aspects of the ILO’s recent work and thereby
diminish interest in examination of its long-standing role in advocating and implementing
tripartism. Tripartite institutions were created at both micro- and macro-level in several
developing countries in the 21st Century.47 As we have suggested above, some function
remained for many forms of the institution, fuelled by increased demand for regulation by
some developed country companies seeking to reduce reputational risk in their supply
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chains, a demand that has increased since the Rana Plaza disaster.48 A higher
contemporary profile for its activities seems likely to stimulate further investigation of its
many-sided historic role.
Conclusion: persistent and uneven tripartism
A common theme across the papers in this collection is that whilst ambitious neo-
corporatist deal making may be difficult to replicate, tripartism remains possible and,
indeed, tripartite experiments continue regularly to manifest themselves in a wide range of
different settings, a phenomenon that has been particularly evident outside of the better-
known cases in European countries. This reflects a second feature of tripartism highlighted
in the collection: tripartite deals have varied greatly in content, scope and durability
according to historical and indeed national circumstances. In the case of Singapore, the
relative policy autonomy of national government vis-a`-vis external players allowed some
scope for deal-making with the aim of helping secure the national policy objectives of
political and economic sustainability. In the case of the countries of Southern Africa,
strong pressures militated towards deal making at a time when the transition to democracy
was uncertain and fragile, but an aggressive counter-movement by employers and their
allies in government occurred once stability had been secured.
The prospects of tripartite deal-making are shaped by powerful international forces.
However, it is possible to over-estimate the power of international financial institutions
and MNEs, and under-estimate the need for supra-national legitimacy and stability. Whilst
by no means a rare feature of social life, the economically beneficial effects of social
instability and war are restricted to tiny e´lite factions, giving many business interests and
other societal actors a real interest in alternatives.
Thus, we argue that although tripartism’s heyday is clearly past, it remains a viable
option and its history is therefore relevant both as a significant historic manifestation of
social compromise and as a massive and diverse repository of experience. Whilst, as we
and our contributors have argued, lacunae undoubtedly remain, the contributions in this
special edition constitute a considerable step forward in enlarging the stock of historical
knowledge on which actors may draw. As in relation to previous epochs, a very real risk
exists of imparting a determinist analysis to the present and apparently endless economic
crisis. Whilst neo-liberalism may have proved remarkably durable, its difficulties with
economic realities notwithstanding (as it is, after all, primarily a vehicle for elite
enrichment), this does not mean that the public space for debating new ideas, or the
possibility for political action and the adoption of meaningful alternatives, have
disappeared. As the experience of different forms of tripartism around the world
demonstrates, it remains possible even in very difficult circumstances, to bring about
compromises that help secure political and economic sustainability, greater social equity,
and, higher productivity than might otherwise have seemed possible.
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